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Ghosts of Innocent Men:  
Necessary Implications of Skinner v. Switzer 
Kathryn A. Harrington  
INTRODUCTION 
Two chicken thighs, a double bacon cheeseburger, fried catfish, 
onion rings, French fries, a salad with ranch dressing, and a 
milkshake.
1
 Forty-seven minutes were left when Hank Skinner‘s last 
meal was interrupted in dramatic fashion.
2
 The Supreme Court had 
issued a stay of execution pending resolution of his petition for 
certiorari.
3
 Untested DNA evidence exists, and questions about 
Skinner‘s guilt in a 1993 New Year‘s Eve triple murder remain.4 In 
 
  J.D. Candidate (2012), Washington University Law School; B.A., Psychology  (2006), 
Duke University. Special thanks to Lindsay Herf, Attorney/DNA Case Manager at the Arizona 
Justice Project, to Journal members Matthew Schoonover and Laura Vaughn for their fantastic 
edits and encouragement, and to Joanne, Neil, Joe, Maggie, and Harry Harrington.  
 1. Eamon McNiff, Down to His Final Meal, Hank Skinner Granted Stay of Execution in 
Texas Murder Case, ABCNEWS.GO.COM (Mar. 25, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/ 
hank-skinner-minute-stay-execution-supreme-court-texas/story?id=10200157. 
 2. Brian Rosenthal, U.S. Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Hank Skinner, Medill 
Innocent Project, THE DAILY NORTHWESTERN (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.dailynorthwestern 
.com/u-s-supreme-court-rules-in-favor-of-hank-skinner-medill-innocence-project-1.2508424.  
 3. Order in Pending Case, Order List 559 U.S., Skinner v. Switzer, (No. 09-9000) 
(09A743) (Mar. 24, 2010), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/ 
03/Skinner-stay-order-3-24-10.pdf.  
 4. See Complaint ¶¶ 11–21, Skinner v. Switzer, No. 2:09-CV-00281-J (N.D. Tex. Nov. 
27, 2009). Skinner was convicted with circumstantial evidence. Id. ¶ 13. Robert Donnell, the 
victim‘s uncle, was never investigated as an alternate suspect despite evidence that Donnell 
stalked the victim on the night of the murder, and that a windbreaker jacket found at the crime 
scene was very similar to one that he owned. Id. Further, Skinner‘s physical ability to commit a 
triple murder was questionable due to the large amounts of alcohol and codeine that he had 
ingested on the night of the murders. Id. Moreover, Skinner sustained a prior injury that 
affected the use of his right hand. Id. This fact made it more unlikely that Skinner had the 
ability to forcefully stab three victims to death with his right hand. Id. A key witness recanted 
her previous statements implicating Skinner, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Skinner v. Switzer, 
130 S. Ct. 3323 (2010) (No. 09-9000), 2010 WL 2101867 at *9 n.5, and jurors now doubt their 
initial decision to convict Skinner, Rachel Cicurel et al., Hank Skinner Death Penalty Case: 
Texas Jurors Reconsider Verdict, POLITICS DAILY (Jan. 5, 2011) (―Five say they might have 
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March 2011, the Supreme Court recognized Skinner‘s right to sue 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for access to untested DNA evidence.
5
 
Skinner‘s § 1983 suit is pending in federal court in Texas.6 He awaits 
the decision on death row.
7
  
Skinner was convicted of capital murder in March 1995 in Gray 
County, Texas.
8
 His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal and he 
was sentenced to death.
9
 Skinner has repeatedly requested that DNA 
testing be performed on seven potentially probative items of crime 
scene evidence.
10
 Testing has yet to occur, but his execution date has 
been set multiple times.
11
  
Skinner‘s case is not unusual.12 DNA evidence is routinely 
collected from crime scenes nationwide and is largely regarded as the 
 
had reasonable doubt at the time of the trial if they had known then what they know now. Seven 
are calling for DNA testing of all the evidence so they can be certain they convicted the right 
man.‖), available at http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/06/09/hank-skinner-death-penalty-case-
texas-jurors-reconsider-verdict/. 
 5. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011). The Court recognized the right to file a 
civil suit for access to DNA evidence, but a Texas federal court will decide his case on the 
merits and will determine whether or not Skinner actually receives access to the evidence. See 
id.  
 6. Amanda Buck, Death Date is Set: Former County Man on Death Row in Texas, 
MARTINSVILLE BULLETIN (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.martinsvillebulletin.com/article.cfm?ID= 
29556.  
 7. Id. Skinner‘s execution date, originally for March 24, 2011 was reset to November 9, 
2011. See id. On November 7, 2011, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stayed his November 
9 execution date pending an analysis of how newly enacted Texas DNA law (SB 122) affects 
Skinner. Skinner gets Stay to Determine if He’ll get DNA Testing, THE AGITATOR (Nov. 7, 
2011), http://www.theagitator.com/2011/11/07/skinner-will-get-dna-testing/; see also infra, 
AFTERWORD. This Note discusses the narrow issue of whether DNA evidence requests are 
cognizable under § 1983 or whether they should be confined to Habeas Corpus. Updates 
concerning the Skinner case that are outside the scope of this issue are discussed infra 
AFTERWARD.  
 8. Skinner was convicted of killing his girlfriend Twila Busby and her two sons, Elwin 
Caler and Randy Busby, on December 31, 1993. Brief for Petitioner, Skinner v. Switzer, 130 S. 
Ct. 3323 (argued Oct. 13, 2010) (No. 09-9000), 2010 WL 2937558 at *2. Skinner admits that he 
was present in the home during the murders but asserts that because he was heavily intoxicated 
from alcohol and codeine he lacked the physical ability to commit a triple murder. Id. at *2-3. 
 9. Skinner v. State, 956 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).  
 10. Complaint, supra note 4, ¶¶ 21–31. Skinner requested the DNA evidence through 
Chapter 64 motions, federal and state habeas discovery provisions, and in telephone 
conferences with the State. Id. ¶¶ 21–31. For a list of the seven items Skinner requested, see 
infra note 56. Skinner has also requested DNA testing under SB 122. See infra AFTERWORD.  
 11. See supra notes 6, 7, 113–20 and accompanying text. 
 12. Skinner is the not the first potentially innocent man on Texas‘s death row. Kevin 
Cooper Fact Sheet, FREE KEVIN COOPER, http://www.savekevincooper.org/Scripts/Data 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol38/iss1/10
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most probative evidence available.
13
 DNA evidence, however, is 
neither automatically nor routinely tested.
14
 Permission to test the 
evidence is conditioned upon satisfying the specific procedural 
requirements of each state‘s post-conviction DNA access statute15 
and is often denied.
16
 Because Texas denied his requests, Skinner 
sought permission to access the DNA evidence under § 1983.
17
 DNA 
testing under § 1983 was his last chance.
18
  
 
Libraries/upload/kevincooper_fact_sheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2012) (―In 2004, Texas 
executed Cameron Todd Willingham for the arson deaths of his two daughters. We now know 
that Mr. Willingham was innocent.‖). Nor is Texas the only state where the execution of an 
innocent man has occurred. Id. (―In 2009, as a result of an investigation of the State of North 
Carolina‘s Crime Laboratory, two former FBI agents concluded that false forensic evidence had 
been used, and exonerating evidence hidden from the defense, in 280 criminal cases over 16 
years. In three of those cases men were executed before the truth was uncovered.‖). And in 
California, Kevin Cooper, a man that the Ninth Circuit has called potentially ―innocent‖ sits on 
death row. Id. Cooper was convicted of murder in 1985. Id. Accusations were made that the 
prosecution planted Cooper‘s blood on the crime scene evidence and DNA tests show that this 
likely occurred. Id. The prosecution‘s expert has since withdrawn the DNA evidence and has 
admitted that the DNA evidence used to support his guilt had been contaminated in his 
laboratory. Id. Despite the fact that all the evidence used to convict Cooper has now been 
discredited, California still plans to execute Cooper. Id. Further, Chromosomal Laboratories, 
Inc., an Arizona DNA lab, has offered to retest the DNA evidence in Cooper‘s case for free. 
Telephone Interview with Jim Bentley, DNA Analyst, Chromosomal Labs., Inc. (Feb. 2, 2011). 
Like Texas in the Skinner case, California refuses to release the evidence for further testing. Id.  
 13. Dist. Attorney‘s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2316 (2009).  
 14. Access to Post-Conviction DNA Testing, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence 
project.org/Content/Access_To_PostConviction_DNA_Testing.php (last visited Nov. 13, 
2011). Even in cases where DNA evidence is available and would definitively prove guilt or 
innocence, some state statutes still deny testing. Id.; see also Michael P. Luongo, Note, Post-
Conviction Due Process Right to Access DNA Evidence, 29 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 127, 
133–36 (2010) (explaining how various state statutory requirements severely limit a prisoner‘s 
ability to secure post-conviction DNA testing). 
 15. Forty-eight states have statutes that govern access to DNA evidence. Access to Post-
Conviction DNA testing, supra note 14. Only Massachusetts and Oklahoma do not have post-
conviction DNA access statutes. Id. For a more complete discussion of each state‘s specific 
post-conviction DNA statute, see Reforms by State, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www. 
innocenceproject.org/news/LawView2.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2012). 
 16. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2316–17 (explaining that the availability of DNA evidence 
alone is not enough to ensure that it will be tested because states may impose statutory 
requirements that restrict a prisoners ability to secure testing).  
 17. See generally infra Part I.C.1.  
 18. The stay would have been revoked and Skinner executed if the Supreme Court did not 
recognize DNA evidence requests under § 1983. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Skinner v. 
Switzer, 130 S. Ct. 3323 at 6:4-10 (argued Oct. 13, 2010) (No. 09-9000), 2010 WL 3999615. 
Developments in Texas law have now allowed Skinner a chance to pursue DNA testing under 
SB 122. See infra AFTERWORD.  
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Skinner v. Switzer asked the Supreme Court to decide ―whether 
Heck [Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)] bars § 1983 actions 
brought by convicted persons seeking access to evidence for DNA 
testing.‖19 The Supreme Court held that Heck did not.20 Heck bars 
from § 1983 all claims that ―necessarily imply‖ the invalidity of the 
underlying conviction and confines them to writs of habeas corpus.
21
 
The same issue was before the Supreme Court in District Attorney’s 
Office v. Osborne, but it was left unanswered.
22
 Though Osborne 
sidelined the issue, eight circuits had defined the habeas exception to 
§ 1983 DNA evidence requests prior to the Court‘s March 2011 
ruling.
23
 Circuits were split—two limited DNA evidence requests to 
habeas while six recognized the claim under § 1983.
24
  
The split illustrated a familiar tension—that of allocating the new 
opportunity afforded by DNA evidence and that of preserving the 
necessary finality of state criminal convictions.
25
 Striking a definitive 
balance between the two was a line that the Osborne Court was 
reluctant to draw.
26
 Because Osborne found that nearly every state 
addressed the post-conviction DNA issue adequately and 
effectively,
27
 it declined to interfere.
28
 In Skinner, however, the 
Supreme Court drew the line to uniformly include DNA evidence 
requests under § 1983.
29
 This was the correct decision. The Equal 
Protection Clause prohibits the ability of circuit-specific procedural 
technicalities to bar access to potentially probative DNA evidence.
30
  
 
 19. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 25.  
 20. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2011).  
 21. For a more complete explanation of the Heck test, see infra notes 83–88 and 
accompanying text. 
 22. See infra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.  
 23. See generally infra Part I.B.3.  
 24. See generally infra Part I.B.3. 
 25. See Dist. Att‘y‘s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2322 (2009).  
 26. Id. at 2323.  
 27. Id. at 2316; see also supra note 15.  
 28. 129 S. Ct. at 2320–23.  
 29. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2011); see also Editorial, Death, DNA and 
The Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2010, at A34.  
 30. See Death, DNA and the Supreme Court, supra note 29 (―But to disqualify Mr. 
Skinner now from obtaining the testing would elevate game-playing over truth-seeking and 
ignore the need to ensure, best as possible, that the right person has been convicted. Testing 
such evidence should not be left to a strategic decision; it should be standard in a serious 
criminal investigation.‖).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol38/iss1/10
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But for the more than 3,000 U.S. death row inmates,
31
 the 
Supreme Court in Skinner should have gone further.
32
 A federal 
constitutional right for death row inmates with set execution dates to 
test any available, untested DNA evidence should be established.
33
 If 
a man is set to die when potentially probative DNA evidence exists in 
a testable condition, then the criminal justice system must speak 
loudly and uniformly in favor of new opportunity.
34
 If state post-
conviction statutes deny DNA analysis, especially at no additional 
cost to the state,
35
 then the statute is neither adequate nor effective for 
its death row inmates.
36
 Finality is not served, and state deference not 
deserved, if answerable questions are purposefully left unanswered 
when the execution occurs.
37
 
Part I of this Note briefly describes the history of DNA evidence 
in the criminal justice system, examines the relevant state and federal 
statutes governing post-conviction relief, and outlines the case law 
leading to the Skinner issue. Part I concludes with a discussion of 
Skinner‘s procedural history and the specific arguments made for and 
against recognizing DNA evidence requests under § 1983. Part II 
analyzes the circuit split over § 1983 DNA evidence requests and 
argues that the Supreme Court correctly recognized the claim under 
Heck. Skinner‘s ability to establish a valid § 1983 claim based on a 
procedural due process violation is analyzed and alternative 
 
 31. Death Row Inmates by State and Size of Death Row by Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. 
CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2012).  
 32. See generally infra Part III. 
 33. Death, DNA and The Supreme Court, supra note 29 (―In an age when DNA 
technology can help identify the guilty and avoid grave miscarriages of justice, states should not 
be allowed to block testing of available biological evidence before executing someone.‖). 
 34. Id. (―There is a value in criminal law to the finality of verdicts and not permitting 
prisoners endless legal challenges to their convictions. The state should not execute prisoners. 
But since it does, the justices should be more concerned with the finality of executing someone 
when untested DNA evidence might shed light on his culpability and the state cannot be 
completely certain of his guilt.‖).  
 35. An Arizona DNA lab volunteered to test the seven items that Skinner requested free of 
cost. Telephone Interview with Jim Bentley, supra note 12. 
 36. Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor has called the execution of an innocent man a 
―constitutionally intolerable event.‖ Fact Sheet, supra note 12.  
 37. Id. (―Public confidence in the proper administration of the death penalty depends on 
the integrity of the process followed by the state.‖). 
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arguments to secure DNA testing are suggested.
38
 Part III proposes a 
federal constitutional right for state death row inmates to test any 
available DNA evidence at the time their execution date is set. 
I. HISTORY 
A. What’s Your Bloodsworth: DNA in the Criminal Justice System 
In 1923, Judge Learned Hand stated that ―[o]ur [criminal] 
procedure has been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man 
convicted.‖39 In 1989, DNA testing first brought that ghost to light.40 
And the ghosts keep coming.
41
 To date, DNA has exonerated 
seventeen capital defendants nationwide.
42
 The first was Maryland 
death row inmate Kirk Bloodsworth, who was exonerated by DNA 
testing in 1993.
43
 Texas‘s first death row DNA exoneration occurred 
fifteen years later in 2008.
44
  
 
 38. See infra Part II. 
 39. McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. 
Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923)). For an overview of DNA exonerations in the 
United States, see Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 
2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 (2006). 
 40. See Gross et al., supra note 39; see also Know the Cases: Gary Dotson, INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Gary_Dotson.php (last visited Nov. 13, 
2011). Gary Dotson was convicted of rape in 1979. Id. In 1988, DNA testing of the semen stain 
positively excluded Dotson as the perpetrator. Id. Dotson was exonerated on August 14, 1989, 
after serving eight years in prison. Id.  
 41. As of February 10, 2012, DNA results have been responsible for 289 inmate 
exonerations. Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www. 
innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_Exonerations.php (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2012). In well over a third of these exonerations, DNA evidence has also led to the 
identification of the true culprit. Id. In addition to exonerating inmates and identifying culprits, 
DNA evidence has excluded over tens of thousands of criminal suspects from further 
investigation. Id.  
 42. Seventeen is the current number as of February 10, 2012. The Innocence List, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-list-those-freed-death-row 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2012). In order for DNA to be considered responsible for the exoneration, 
the Innocence Project requires that DNA play a role in the reversal, be crucial to the prisoner‘s 
defense, and help identify the true perpetrator. Id. As of February 7, 2012, a total of 140 death 
row inmates have been exonerated through various means. Innocence and the Death Penalty, 
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-death-penalty# 
inn-st (last updated Feb. 7, 2012).  
 43. TIM JUNKIN, BLOODSWORTH: THE TRUE STORY OF THE FIRST DEATH ROW INMATE 
EXONERATED BY DNA (2004); see also Innocence Cases: 1984–1993, DEATH PENALTY INFO. 
CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-cases-1984-1993 (last visited Feb. 10, 2012). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol38/iss1/10
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DNA testing in the criminal justice system began in the mid-
1980s.
45
 Testing techniques are constantly evolving
46
 and now allow 
for complete or partial DNA profiles to be constructed from most 
items of crime scene evidence containing biological material.
47
 The 
DNA profile extracted from the evidence is referred to as the ―source 
DNA.‖48 Once identified, the suspect‘s DNA is collected and 
 
Kirk Bloodsworth was convicted of rape and murder in 1993. Id. He spent nine years in prison 
before DNA evidence revealed his innocence. Id.  
 44. See Innocence Cases: 2004–Present, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.death 
penaltyinfo.org/innocence-cases-2004-present#130 (last visited Feb. 10, 2012). Michael Blair 
was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in 1994. Id. He was exonerated in May 2008. 
Id. He remains in prison for life on other charges. Id.  
 45. Luongo, supra note 14, at 130. While an intensive discussion of forensic DNA 
analysis is beyond the scope of this Note, see DNA Forensics, HUMAN GENOME PROJECT INFO., 
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/forensics.shtml (last updated June 
16, 2009), for a more detailed overview of DNA analysis in the criminal justice system. For 
specific examples of how DNA evidence has exonerated wrongfully convicted inmates, see 
generally Know the Cases, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2012).  
 46. Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphim (RFLP) testing was the first DNA testing 
technique used in the criminal justice system and could conclusively exclude suspects. Luongo, 
supra note 14, at 130. In order to create a DNA profile, RFLP required large amounts of genetic 
material to exist on properly preserved pieces of crime scene evidence. Id. at 130 n.32. 
Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) is an alternative technique that allows for DNA profiles to 
be created from biological material that is either too small or too degraded for RFLP. Id. at 130. 
PCR can definitively exclude a suspect and can match a suspect to the source DNA with a 
ninety-five percent statistical certainty. Id.  
 The PCR technique advanced into Short Tandem Repeat (STR), id., which is now the 
standard DNA forensic technique. Osborne v. Dist. Att‘y‘s Office, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2315 n.3 
(2009). To date, STR is the most discriminating testing technique available and became popular 
in the mid to late 1990s. See Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 
1659 (2008). STR testing has since developed into Y-STR (STR testing on the Y chromosome 
only) and mini-STR (examining an even smaller portion of the STR locus). Mini-STR Testing, 
DNA DIAGNOSTICS CTR., http://www.forensicdnacenter.com/dna-ministr.html (last visited Feb. 
10, 2012). Mini-STR testing dramatically increases the sensitivity of DNA detection on crime 
scene evidence and allows for scientists to create DNA profiles from very small, degraded, or 
compromised samples. Id. Previously untestable DNA samples may now be analyzed with 
mini-STR technology. Id.  
 Finally, mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) is a unique technique in that it tests DNA from the 
mitochondria of the cell as opposed to the nucleus. Luongo, supra note 14, at 131. Thus, 
mtDNA can be used to test biological items that do not have a nucleus, such as hair, teeth, or 
bones. Id. However, mtDNA cannot conclusively match a suspect with the source. Id.  
 47. See NAT‘L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, USING DNA TO SOLVE COLD 
CASES 19–21 (2002), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/194197.pdf; Norman C. 
Bay, Old Blood, Bad Blood, and Youngblood: Due Process, Lost Evidence, and the Limits of 
Bad Faith, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 241, 279 (2008).  
 48. See Forensic DNA Fundamentals for the Prosecutor: Be Not Afraid, AM. 
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compared to the source.
49
 A favorable comparison results in a 
―match.‖50 If the suspect‘s DNA profile does not match the source, 
then the suspect is ―excluded.‖51 If neither a match nor a definitive 
exclusion results, then DNA tests are ―inconclusive.‖52 When DNA 
from multiple contributors (for instance, both the victim and the 
perpetrator) is identified, the source is said to contain a ―mixed 
profile.‖53 If properly preserved, DNA evidence may remain available 
for future comparisons and can be subjected to more advanced testing 
techniques.
54
 
The testing technique, condition of the source DNA, and the 
certainty of the match are significant factors that determine the 
probative value of the DNA test results.
55
 Under § 1983, Skinner 
requested access to seven items, all of which may contain potentially 
probative biological material, and six of which have never been 
tested.
56
  
B. Necessary Implications: Success Under § 1983 
1. Post-Conviction Statutory Relief  
Three statutory remedies for post-conviction relief were at issue in 
Skinner. First, Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 
(Chapter 64) governs access to post-conviction DNA evidence for all 
 
PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST. 13–14 (2003), available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/forensic_ 
dna_fundamentals.pdf. 
 49. Id. at 13.  
 50. See id. The certainty of the match depends on the testing technique and the amount 
and condition of the recovered biological material found on the source. Id. at 13–14.  
 51. See NAT‘L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 5–6.  
 52. Interpreting DNA Test Results, DNA INITIATIVE, http://www.dna.gov/audiences/ 
victim/know/interpreting (last visited Nov. 13, 2011). 
 53. See DNA Profiling, BERICON, http://www.bericon.co.uk/go/our-services/dna-biology/ 
dna-profiling/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2012).  
 54. See id. at 3.  
 55. See generally Forensic DNA Fundamentals for the Prosecutor: Be Not Afraid, supra 
note 48, at 7–15.  
 56. Complaint, supra note 4, ¶ 36. Skinner requested testing on the vaginal swabs from 
victim Twila Busby, Busby‘s fingernail clippings, a knife found on the front porch, a knife and 
a dishtowel found in a plastic bag in the living room, a windbreaker jacket found in the living 
room next to Busby‘s body, and hairs found in Busby‘s hands. Id. The hairs have been tested, 
but the results were inconclusive. Id. ¶¶ 18–19. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol38/iss1/10
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Texas prisoners.
57
 Additionally, all state prisoners have two federal 
remedies—a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2255, and a 
civil rights claim under § 1983.
58
 
Texas enacted Chapter 64
 
in April 2001.
59
 The statute conditions 
DNA testing on the prisoner‘s ability to meet certain requirements.60 
Two requirements were relevant in Skinner.
61
 First, prisoners must 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that they ―would not 
have been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through 
DNA testing.‖62 Second, prisoners must show that the failure to 
previously test the evidence was due to ―no fault of the convicted 
person, for reasons that are of a nature such that the interests of 
justice require DNA testing.‖63 
Habeas relief is limited to attacks on the conviction or legality of 
the confinement.
64
 Section 2254 requires that prisoners be in custody 
in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States 
and that they first exhaust all available state court remedies.
65
 
 
 57. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64 (West 2010). See infra AFTERWARD for a 
discussion of the recent changes made to Texas Post-Conviction DNA law. This Note, however, 
analyzes the law as it was in effect for Skinner.  
 58. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 491–92 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring).  
 59. CRIM. PROC. art. 64. As of the date the brief was submitted, there had been twenty-
three DNA exclusions and eighteen DNA exonerations under Chapter 64. Brief for Tarrant 
County Criminal District Attorney, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Skinner v. 
Switzer, 130 S. Ct. 3323 (2010) (No. 09-9000), 2010 WL 4114159 at *18. 
 60. Chapter 64 grants post-conviction DNA testing only if the items remain untested 
because DNA testing was either unavailable, technologically incapable of providing probative 
results, or if the items can now be retested using more advanced DNA testing technology. 
CRIM. PROC. art. 64.01(b)(1)(A)-(B), (2). Texas prisoners may file successive Chapter 64 
motions, there is no statute of limitations, and any convicted prisoner may file a motion. Brief 
for Respondent, Skinner v. Switzer, 130 S. Ct. 3323 (argued Oct. 13, 2010) (No. 09-9000), 
2010 WL 3559537 at *41.  
 61. See supra notes 113–18 and accompanying text.  
 62. CRIM. PROC. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A). 
 63. Id. art. 64.01(b)(1)(B). 
 64. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (―It is clear, not only from the 
language [of the statute] but also from the common-law history of the writ, that the essence of 
habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the 
traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.‖).  
 65. Id. at 483. A prisoner has not exhausted state court remedies if he may still raise his 
claim under any statute in state court. Id.  
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Primarily, the exhaustion requirement preserves federal-state 
comity.
66
 
A § 1983 civil rights suit is the broader of the two federal 
remedies
67
 and provides relief for constitutional violations at the 
hands of state officials.
68
 State prisoners must establish two elements 
under § 1983: ―that defendants deprived [them] of a federal 
constitutional right; and that defendants acted under color of state 
law.‖69  
Three major differences exist between the two federal remedies. 
First, habeas requires that prisoners exhaust all available state court 
remedies;
70
 state remedies need not exhausted before a prisoner may 
file a § 1983 claim.
71
 Second, res judicata does not bar habeas claims 
but does preclude § 1983 claims.
72
 Finally, habeas relief is reserved 
solely for allegations of unlawful conviction or confinement, whereas 
§ 1983 may be used to challenge any constitutional violation, except 
 
 66. For a discussion of the state‘s unique role in the criminal justice system, see id. at 
490–500.  
 67. See Dist. Att‘y‘s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2318 (2009). 
 68. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) in full:  
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, 
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.  
 69. Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 
602, 606 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
 70. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (West 2010); Skinner v. Quarterman, No. 2:00-CV-0045, 2007 
WL 582808, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2007).  
 71. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 84 (2005) (explaining that § 1983 does not require 
exhaustion because it does not invalidate the conviction and thus does not infringe upon 
federal-state comity).  
 72. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 497 (1973). Texas has potentially viable res 
judicata and Rooker-Feldman arguments against Skinner‘s § 1983 claim. Report and 
Recommendation to Grant Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss § 1983 Complaint at 12, Skinner v. 
Switzer, No. 2:09-CV-00281-J at 40 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 15, 2010) [hereinafter Report and 
Recommendation]. Skinner did not initially assert a constitutional challenge against Chapter 64. 
Id. at 6. Texas argues that Skinner‘s delayed attempt to bring a constitutional challenge is 
barred by either the res judicata or Rooker-Feldman doctrines. See id. at 12. For more 
information regarding the potential res judicata and Rooker-Feldman implications on Skinner‘s 
§ 1983 claim, see id. at 1–12. The Supreme Court later ruled that the Rocker-Feldman doctrine 
does not bar Skinner‘s claim. 131 S. Ct. 1239, 1297 (2011).  
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those that challenge the lawfulness of the conviction or 
confinement.
73
  
Exactly which claims sufficiently challenge a conviction so as to 
be limited to habeas relief is a difficult question.
74
 The answer is 
made more difficult because most habeas claims will, on their face, 
satisfy the elements required by § 1983.
75
 To preserve the distinct 
nature of habeas relief in the face of this overlap, the Supreme Court 
has explicitly exempted certain claims from § 1983 and confined 
them to habeas.
76
 
2. Supreme Court Carve-Outs: Habeas Exceptions to § 1983 
The Supreme Court first addressed the statutory overlap in Preiser 
v. Rodriguez.
77
 Under § 1983, three prisoners claimed that the 
deprivation of good-time credits violated their due process rights.
78
 
While the Court recognized that the claims fell within the plain 
language of § 1983,
79
 it nonetheless held that the sole federal remedy 
rested in a writ of habeas corpus.
80
 The Court stated that the relief 
sought by the prisoners—immediate release from custody due to 
application of the good time credits—was of the traditional habeas 
nature.
81
 This, coupled with the fact that habeas provided the specific 
relief requested—release from confinement—convinced the Court 
that habeas was the exclusive remedy.
82
  
 
 73. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 484–86.  
 74. Evidence of this difficulty is illustrated by the circuit split surrounding DNA evidence 
requests under § 1983. See infra Part I.B.3.  
 75. Durr v. Cordray, 602 F.3d 731, 735 (6th Cir. 2010).  
 76. See Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81–82 (explaining that the habeas-§ 1983 distinction 
derived from the need to ―ensure that state prisoners use only habeas‖ when they directly or 
indirectly attack the duration of their confinement). 
 77. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 475.  
 78. Id. at 478. The appellate court consolidated the three cases and recognized the claims 
under § 1983. Id. at 482. 
 79. See id. at 489.  
 80. Id. at 500 (―What is involved here is the extent to which § 1983 is a permissible 
alternative to the traditional remedy of habeas corpus. . . . [W]e hold today that when a state 
prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he 
seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that 
imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.‖). 
 81. Id. at 487; see also supra note 64.  
 82. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489–90.  
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In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court defined the habeas 
exception to § 1983 in the context of claims for monetary damages 
premised on unlawful convictions.
83
 Unlike in Preiser, the relief 
requested in Heck was not of the traditional habeas nature nor was the 
remedy sought available through habeas proceedings.
84
 Nevertheless, 
the Court held that such claims were not cognizable under § 1983.
85
 
The much-cited Heck test was announced: ―whether a judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his 
conviction or sentence; if it would, [then] the [§ 1983] complaint 
must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the 
conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.‖86 Conversely, if 
a judgment for the plaintiff on the § 1983 claim would not 
necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction, then the § 1983 
claim may proceed.
87
 Because a court cannot award monetary 
damages for unlawful confinement without also necessarily implying 
the unlawfulness of the conviction or confinement, Heck‘s claim was 
excluded from § 1983.
88
  
The habeas exception to § 1983 was applied to state criminal 
procedures in Wilkinson v. Dotson.
89
 The Supreme Court held that 
claims challenging state parole procedures were cognizable under 
§ 1983.
90
 Dotson applied the Heck test and found that because 
 
 83. 512 U.S. 477 (1994).  
 84. Id. at 481 (citations omitted). Because Heck‘s claim did not fit within the specific 
language of or fall under the traditional function of habeas, his claim was not automatically 
confined to habeas under Preiser. Id. at 481–82. 
 85. Id. at 483.  
 86. Id. at 487 (emphasis added).  
 87. Id.  
 88. Id.  
 89. 544 U.S. 74 (2005). 
 90. Id. at 76, 81–82. In reaching this conclusion, Dotson traced the Supreme Court‘s 
history defining the habeas exception: 
Preiser found an implied exception to § 1983‘s coverage where the claim seeks . . . 
‗core‘ habeas corpus relief, i.e., where a state prisoner requests present or future 
release. Wolff [Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 549 (1974)] makes clear that § 1983 
remains available for procedural challenges where success in the action would not 
necessarily spell immediate or speedier release for the prisoner. Heck specifies that a 
prisoner cannot use § 1983 to obtain damages where success would necessarily imply 
the unlawfulness of a (not previously invalidated) conviction or sentence. And Balisok 
[Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997)] . . . demonstrates that habeas remedies do 
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success on state parole challenges would neither ―necessarily spell 
speedier release‖ nor ―imply the invalidity of their convictions,‖ the 
claims were valid under § 1983.
91
 Notably, Dotson established that a 
prisoner‘s underlying motivation for filing a § 1983 claim is 
irrelevant.
92
  
The Supreme Court in Osborne was asked to define the habeas 
exception to § 1983 in the context of post-conviction DNA evidence 
requests but declined the opportunity.
93
 In a 5–4 decision, the Court 
instead dismissed Osborne‘s § 1983 claim on the basis that there 
exists no freestanding post-conviction substantive due process right 
to access DNA evidence.
94
 The Court stated that because convicted 
prisoners no longer possess full liberty interests, a state operating in 
the post-conviction context need not comply fully with substantive 
due process and may impose certain conditions on DNA testing 
rights.
95
 A procedural due process right to access DNA evidence, 
however, was not foreclosed.
96
 The Court explained that if a state 
chooses to provide post-conviction rights, then the state may not 
arbitrarily deny access to those rights.
97
 Thus, if a prisoner shows 
state post-conviction remedies to be fundamentally inadequate, 
 
not displace § 1983 actions where success in the civil rights suit would not necessarily 
vitiate the legality of a (not previously violated) state confinement. 
Id. at 81 (citation omitted).  
 91. Id. at 82.  
 92. See id. at 78, 91. The state argued that because the prisoners believed that success 
under § 1983 would eventually lead to a speedier release, it was a collateral attack on the 
duration of confinement and should be confined to habeas. Id. at 78. Dotson rejected this 
argument and stated that this was a ―jump from a true premise [that prisoners likely believed 
success under § 1983 would bring earlier release] to a faulty conclusion [that habeas is their 
sole avenue for relief].‖ Id.  
 93. Dist. Att‘y‘s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2316, 2319 (2009). 
 94. Id. at 2320–23 (explaining that because Osborne had not first utilized the state‘s post-
conviction procedures and shown them to be inadequate, he had not yet suffered from any 
constitutional violation at the hands of state officials).  
 95. Id. at 2320 (―[W]hen a State chooses to offer help to those seeking relief from 
convictions [due process] does not dictat[e] the exact form such assistance must assume.‖ 
(quoting Pa. v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 559 (1987))). 
 96. Id. at 2322; Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2011) (―Osborne rejected the 
extension of a substantive due process to this area and left slim room for the prisoner to show 
that the governing state law denies him procedural due process.‖); see also Brandon L. Garrett, 
DNA and Due Process, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2919, 2927 (2010) (explaining that a procedural 
due process right to access DNA evidence is still available after Osborne).  
 97. Garrett, supra note 96, at 2923, 2938–39.  
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unfair, or arbitrary, then a federal court may intervene under § 1983 
on procedural due process grounds.
98
  
3. The Way It Was: § 1983 Circuit Split 
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits in Harvey v. Horan and Kutzner v. 
Montgomery County respectively dismissed DNA evidence requests 
under § 1983.
99
 The Fourth Circuit held that Heck barred such 
requests because DNA tests would ―necessarily imply‖ the invalidity 
of the conviction or sentence.
100
 Petitioner Harvey reasoned that 
because the outcome of the DNA test was unknown, and could in fact 
be inculpatory, his request for DNA evidence did not ―necessarily 
imply‖ the invalidity of his conviction.101 The Fourth Circuit denied 
Harvey‘s request because it reasoned that such claims would ―set the 
stage‖ for a later attack on the conviction.102 Similarly, Kutzner held 
that because DNA access requests are ―so intertwined‖ with the 
conviction, they belonged exclusively in habeas.
103
 Neither circuit has 
readdressed the issue since the Supreme Court decided Dotson, which 
eliminated a prisoner‘s subjective intent from the Heck analysis.104  
The other six circuits that have considered the issue have reached 
the opposite conclusion.
105
 The reasoning for each circuit is largely 
 
 98. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2320 (―[T]he question is whether consideration of Osborne‘s 
claim within the framework of the State‘s procedures for postconviction relief ‗offends some 
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental. . . .‖ (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446 (1992))).  
 99. Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 377 (4th Cir. 2002); Kutzner v. Montgomery Cnty., 
303 F.3d 339, 340–41 (5th Cir. 2002).  
 100. Harvey, 278 F.3d at 374. 
 101. Id. at 375. 
 102. Id. at 378. ―Harvey is seeking access to DNA evidence for one reason and one reason 
only—as the first step in undermining his conviction. He believes that the DNA test results will 
be favorable and will allow him to bring a subsequent motion to invalidate his conviction.‖ Id. 
at 375. 
 103. Kutzner, 303 F.3d at 340–41.  
 104. Report and Recommendation, supra note 72, at 11; see also supra note 92 and 
accompanying text (discussing Dotson‘s elimination of the subjective inquiry). 
 105. See Durr v. Cordray, 602 F.3d 731, 736 (6th Cir. 2010); Grier v. Klem, 591 F.3d 672, 
679 (3d Cir. 2010); McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 2007); Savory v. Lyons, 469 
F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2006); Osborne v. Dist. Att‘y‘s Office, 423 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 
2005), rev’d on other grounds, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009); Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287, 1290 
(11th Cir. 2002).  
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the same.
106
 A prisoner‘s § 1983 request for DNA evidence passes the 
Heck test because success on the claim does not ―necessarily imply‖ 
the invalidity of the conviction.
107
 Successful requests only provide 
access to DNA evidence.
108
 Once tested, DNA results may be 
inculpatory or inconclusive and have no effect on the conviction.
109
 
Even if the DNA results prove to be exculpatory, prisoners must still 
file entirely separate lawsuits in order to then challenge the 
conviction.
110 
These circuits acknowledged that a prisoner‘s 
subjective intent has no place in the Heck analysis.
111
 Even if the 
prisoner‘s ultimate motive is to challenge the conviction, and even if 
DNA results enable the prisoner to later do this, the claim is still 
cognizable under § 1983 because the request for evidence, 
independently and objectively, does not necessarily invalidate the 
conviction.
112
  
C. Stay-ing Alive: Skinner’s Fight 
1. Skinner Procedure  
When Skinner‘s conviction was affirmed on appeal, potentially 
probative DNA evidence remained untested.
113
 Skinner filed two 
Chapter 64 motions requesting that DNA testing be performed on 
seven evidentiary items.
114
 The first motion was denied because 
 
 106. Dotson has proven especially influential: ―Every Court of Appeals to consider the 
question since Dotson has decided that because access to DNA evidence similarly does not 
‗necessarily spell speedier release,‘ it can be brought under § 1983.‖ Dist. Att‘y‘s Office v. 
Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2318 (2009) (quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005)). 
 107. See, e.g., Durr, 602 F.3d at 736; Grier, 591 F.3d at 678; McKithen, 481 F.3d at 102–
03; Bradley, 305 F.3d at 1291.  
 108. See Durr, 602 F.3d at 736; Savory, 469 F.3d at 672; Osborne, 423 F.3d at 1054; 
Bradley, 305 F.3d at 1291. 
 109. See Durr, 602 F.3d at 736; McKithen, 481 F.3d at 102–03; Osborne, 423 F.3d at 1054. 
 110. See Durr, 602 F.3d at 736; McKithen, 481 F.3d at 103; Osborne, 423 F.3d at 1054–55. 
 111. Grier, 591 F.3d at 677 (stating that Dotson ―determined that hope was not sufficient to 
bar a § 1983 claim if that hope could not be realized without further proceedings‖); see also 
Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 383 (4th Cir. 2002) (King, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in judgment) (―A prisoner‘s underlying rationale . . . for bringing his § 1983 suit is not relevant 
under Heck. The applicable standard is an objective one . . . .‖). 
 112. McKithen, 481 F.3d at 103.  
 113. Skinner v. State, 122 S.W.3d 808, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). 
 114. Id. at 811; Skinner v. State, 293 S.W.3d 196, 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). See supra 
note 56 for a list of the seven items that Skinner requested to test. See infra AFTERWORD for a 
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Skinner could not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 
he ―would not have been convicted if exculpatory results [on the 
additional requested items] had been obtained through DNA 
testing.‖115 Texas believed that the existing evidence against Skinner 
was, despite any possible revelations from additional DNA testing, 
enough to support the conviction.
116
 His second motion was denied 
because he could not show that the evidence remained untested at the 
time of trial through ―no fault‖ of his own.117 At trial, defense counsel 
strategically did not request that all available biological items be 
tested.
118
 Skinner did not appeal either denial.
119
 In addition to his 
Chapter 64 motions, Skinner filed state and federal habeas petitions 
requesting that the evidence be tested, both of which were denied.
120
 
On November 27, 2009, Skinner filed his § 1983 claim in federal 
court alleging that Texas‘s refusal to grant him access to the DNA 
evidence violated his civil rights.
121
 The Fifth Circuit denied 
 
discussion of the recent changes made to Texas Post-Conviction DNA law.  
 115. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A) (West 2010); 122 S.W.3d at 811. To 
meet this standard, Texas requires the defendant to prove that there is a reasonable probability 
that he is innocent. Id. Because there was evidence to prove that Skinner was present in the 
home during the commission of the crime, the court held that even with additional exculpatory 
DNA evidence, Skinner could not meet the ―reasonable probability of innocence‖ standard. Id.  
 116. Id. Skinner was convicted largely on circumstantial evidence because the DNA results 
on the select items that Texas chose to test proved only what Skinner had already admitted—
that he was present in the home on the night of the crime. Petitioner‘s Reply to Respondent‘s 
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Skinner v. Switzer, 130 S. Ct. 3323 (2010) 
(No. 09-9000), 2009 WL 6492277 at *3-4; see, e.g., Complaint, supra note 4, ¶¶ 13–18.  
 117. CRIM. PROC. art. 64.01(b)(1)(B); 293 S.W.3d at 201–03.  
 118. 293 S.W.3d at 202–03. At trial, defense counsel argued that the prosecution had run a 
―shoddy investigation‖ and the State‘s decision not to test all available biological items played 
to this theme. Id. at 203.  
 119. Report and Recommendation, supra note 72, at 3. Had Skinner appealed the Chapter 
64 denials, he would have had to petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari. Id.  
 120. Skinner v. Quarterman, No. 2:99-CV-0045, 2007 WL 582808, at *1-2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 
22, 2007). Skinner‘s first state habeas petition was filed on March 26, 1998, but was dismissed 
because it was untimely. Id. at *1. Skinner‘s first federal habeas claim was filed on February 5, 
1999, but was stayed in order to allow Skinner to first present the claim in state court. Id. 
Skinner filed his second state habeas claim on February 27, 2001, but it was dismissed because 
he had a pending federal petition. Id. Skinner was then allowed to proceed in federal court 
without first exhausting his state habeas remedies for fear that his claims would be time barred. 
Id. at *2. He filed an amended habeas petition in federal court on December 2, 2002. Id. This 
petition was denied on appeal in July 2009. Skinner v. Quarterman, 576 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 
2009).  
 121. Complaint, supra note 4, ¶ 1. 
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Skinner‘s § 1983 claim in accordance with Kutzner.122 On February 
12, 2010, Skinner filed a petition for writ of certiorari.
123
 The 
Supreme Court accepted the case on May 24, 2010
124
 and heard 
arguments later that year on October 13.
125
 On March 7, 2011 the 
Supreme Court granted Skinner the right to sue for access to DNA 
evidence under § 1983.
126
 A federal court in Texas will decide 
whether Chapter 64 is procedurally inadequate and consequently, 
whether Skinner will receive access to the DNA evidence.  
2. May it Please the Court 
Skinner argued that Heck does not bar DNA evidence requests 
under § 1983 because access to the evidence does not necessarily 
imply the invalidity of his conviction.
127
 The Heck test, Skinner 
argued, considers only the immediate consequences of success on the 
§ 1983 suit; if Skinner receives the DNA evidence, the conviction 
remains intact.
128
 Skinner asserted that even exculpatory DNA results 
would not invalidate his conviction because in that scenario, he 
would then seek executive clemency.
129
 Moreover, Skinner argued 
that his underlying motivation for requesting access to the DNA 
evidence is irrelevant in light of Dotson.
130
 Skinner maintained that if 
motivation alone was enough to confine a claim to habeas, then the 
 
 122. Skinner v. Switzer, 363 F. App‘x 302 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 123. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at *1. 
 124. Skinner v. Switzer, 364 F. App‘x 113 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 3323 
(2010).  
 125. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at *1. Greg Coleman, former Texas 
Solicitor General and the appellate attorney who argued the case on behalf of Lynn Switzer, 
died in a plane crash on Nov. 23, 2010. Mary Alice Robbins, Plane Crash Claims Life of 
Former Texas Solicitor General Greg Coleman, TEXAS LAWYER (Nov. 24, 2010), http://www. 
law.com/jsp/tx/PubArticleTX.jsp?id=1202475339472. University of Texas Law Professor 
Robert Owen argued the case on behalf of Skinner. Faculty Profiles, THE UNIVERSITY OF 
TEXAS SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/profile.php?id=owenrc (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2011).  
 126. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2011). 
 127. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at *10-17.  
 128. Id. at *16-18.  
 129. Petitioner‘s Reply Brief, Skinner v. Switzer, 130 S. Ct. 3323 (2010) (No. 09-9000), 
2010 WL 3806525 at *10 (―It is well established in Texas and elsewhere that clemency is a 
form of executive mercy that does not invalidate the underlying conviction.‖).  
 130. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18 at 3:15-22, 22:7-12.  
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writ would be stretched far beyond its traditional common-law 
roots.
131
  
Skinner contended that allowing DNA evidence requests under 
§ 1983 is consistent with federal–state comity.132 He noted that the 
Court took state interests into account when it first articulated the 
Heck test.
133
 Skinner also noted that Osborne further cemented the 
state‘s primary role in the criminal justice system by requiring 
prisoners to first show state procedures to be inadequate before a 
procedural due process claim under § 1983 may be heard in federal 
court.
134
 Alternatively, Skinner argued that even if the Court found it 
necessary to reformulate the Heck test as it applies to DNA evidence 
requests,
135
 the Court was compelled to adhere to stare decisis and 
congressional intent when considering his case.
136
 
In order to ultimately secure access to the DNA evidence from the 
Texas federal court, Skinner must succeed on the merits.
137
 At oral 
argument, and what will likely constitute his argument on remand, 
Skinner asserted that Chapter 64 violated his procedural due process 
rights.
138
 Osborne stated that prisoners with state-created liberty 
interests may seek federal relief if they have been denied a 
 
 131. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at *23-24. Skinner argued that excluding 
from § 1983 claims that only ―set the stage‖ for future attacks on the conviction would 
consequently broaden habeas to include claims of a nature far beyond the writ‘s traditional 
purpose. Id.; see also supra note 64 for a discussion of the common law origins of habeas 
corpus.  
 132. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at *33. 
 133. Id. at *34 (―[T]he Court has ‗already placed the States‘ important comity 
considerations in the balance, weighed them against the competing need to vindicate federal 
rights without exhaustion, and concluded that prisoners may bring their claims without fully 
exhausting state-court remedies so long as their suits, if established, would not necessarily 
invalidate state-imposed confinement.‘‖ (quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 84 
(2005))). 
 134. Id. (―Under Osborne, a state prisoner who brings a due process challenge to the 
adequacy of state DNA testing procedures cannot prevail without first having tried to invoke 
those procedures.‖); Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2011). 
 135. During oral arguments, Justice Antonin Scalia remarked that the Heck test could be 
reformulated in order to bar claims that do not necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction 
but that are brought solely ―to demonstrate . . . the invalidity of the judgment.‖ Transcript of 
Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 43:15-17.  
 136. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at *35-37.  
 137. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
 138. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 11:7-25–12:1-11. 
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fundamentally fair procedure at the state court level.
139
 Skinner stated 
that Chapter 64 creates a liberty interest and argued that his ability to 
vindicate that interest was arbitrarily denied.
140
 In essence, Skinner 
asserted that Chapter 64 is unconstitutional ―‗as construed‘ by the 
Texas courts.‖141 Specifically, Skinner took issue with the no-fault 
provision: ―the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals construed the 
statute to completely foreclose any prisoner who could have sought 
DNA testing prior to trial but did not from seeking testing under 
[Chapter 64].‖142 Skinner argued that this provision is fundamentally 
unfair because it provides no exception to the rule.
143
  
Texas countered that Skinner‘s § 1983 claim would lose on the 
merits because Chapter 64 is constitutional, both facially and as 
applied.
144 
Osborne mandates that all post-conviction procedural due 
process claims be made in the context of state-created liberty 
interests.
145
 While Texas conceded that Chapter 64 creates a state 
liberty interest in proving innocence, Texas also highlighted that 
Chapter 64 requires prisoners to first assert their innocence.
146
 Thus, 
Texas reasoned that Skinner cannot simultaneously utilize Chapter 64 
(assert innocence, which goes to the conviction and thus is confined 
to habeas) and also maintain that he was not attacking the conviction 
under § 1983.
147
  
 
 139. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at *29 (―[Osborne] left the federal courthouse door 
open to those prisoners who possess a state-created liberty interest in proving their innocence 
through new evidence, but are deprived by state officials of fundamentally fair procedures 
necessary to vindicate that interest.‖).  
 140. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 13:7-18, 24:2-9, 54:4-56:18. 
 141. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2011). 
 142. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 52:6-11.  
 143. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at *7.  
 144. Brief for Respondent, supra note 60, at *40-41 (―[A]rticle 64 contains all the key 
elements for ‗a good DNA access law‘ recommended by the Innocence Project.‖). See generally 
Access to Post-Conviction DNA Testing, supra note 14.  
 145. Brief for Respondent, supra note 60, at *28. 
 146. Id. (―Skinner‘s asserted procedural due process right is completely bound up in and 
dependent upon this claimed state-law liberty interest in showing his innocence.‖).  
 147. Id. at *31 (―The article 64 procedure Skinner is attacking is itself inseparable from 
questions about Skinner‘s guilt or innocence and the conduct of the underlying trial.‖); see also 
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 42:17-22 (―But there are really only two results 
in article 64. One is a ruling that you probably would not have been convicted. Or two, I reject 
your request for a ruling that you probably would not have been convicted. And that‘s what he 
got. It is a motion that goes to the core of the conviction itself.‖).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
344 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 38:325 
 
 
Assuming arguendo that Chapter 64‘s no-fault provision is 
procedurally unconstitutional, Texas maintained that DNA evidence 
requests under § 1983 are barred by Heck.
148
 Texas argued that 
Heck’s ―necessarily implies‖ language is not a ―magic words test‖ in 
which the inquiry begins and ends.
149
 Rather, Texas insisted that 
Heck requires a full examination of the connection between the 
§ 1983 claim and the conviction.
150
 Because Texas viewed Skinner‘s 
DNA request as ―inextricably‖ connected to his conviction, his claim 
was barred by Heck.
151
 Moreover, because the relief sought was relief 
that could be granted through habeas discovery provisions, Texas 
reasoned that the claim must be confined exclusively to habeas.
152
  
Finally, Texas argued that reading Heck to bar only those claims 
with immediate consequences on the conviction would frustrate the 
purpose of the habeas exception.
153
 Specifically, Texas worried that 
limiting the Heck bar would abolish state court deference in the 
criminal system, undermine finality by permitting collateral attacks 
on the conviction, and open the floodgates to unnecessary § 1983 
litigation.
154
 Texas argued that because the habeas exception to 
§ 1983 was created to ensure that states retain final control over all 
criminal procedures affecting the conviction,
155
 providing prisoners 
 
 148. Brief for Respondent, supra note 60, at *28. 
 149. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 32:25-33:2 (―I disagree that the two 
words ‗necessarily implies‘ are in fact sort of the end of the battle and the end of the test.‖). 
 150. Brief for Respondent, supra note 60, at *21-23.  
 151. Id. at *26–29 (explaining that the relief sought, DNA evidence, has a ―material 
bearing on his conviction‖ and cannot be separated from his dependent Chapter 64 claim 
asserting innocence). The Supreme Court dismissed these concerns. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. 
Ct. 1289, 1298–1300 (2011) 
 152. Id. at *29; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 45:5-8.  
 153. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 60, at *41-47 (allowing DNA evidence requests 
under § 1983 would allow prisoners to re-litigate state court determinations in federal courts). 
 154. Id. at *47. Texas argues:  
Certainly, Skinner advances no limiting principle to restrict this new § 1983 cause of 
action to [Chapter] 64 proceedings (or similar proceedings under analogous state DNA 
statutes). Instead, any time a state court denies a prisoner access to discovery in a state 
postconviction proceeding, he will have placed in his back pocket a future § 1983 
lawsuit after losing all other avenues to invalidate his conviction.  
Id.  
 155. See supra note 66. 
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with alternative routes to attack the conviction and allowing federal 
courts to re-litigate the claim under § 1983 cannot be correct.
156
  
II. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court in Skinner correctly recognized DNA 
evidence requests under § 1983.
157
 Because Dotson stripped the Heck 
test of all subjective inquiries,
158
 the rationale for denying DNA 
evidence requests under § 1983 is no longer sound.
159
 Accordingly, 
the Fifth Circuit‘s holding in Kutzner was overruled and a district 
court in Texas will decide whether Skinner will receive access to the 
DNA evidence under § 1983.
160
  
The Supreme Court recognized the fallacies in the Fourth and 
Fifth Circuits.
161
 Both incorrectly applied the Heck test because, 
rather than evaluating the immediate consequence that success on the 
§ 1983 claim would have on the conviction, both circuits considered 
the effect of exculpatory DNA test results on the conviction.
162
 
Essentially, Harvey and Kutzner applied Heck to the wrong facts. 
They asked whether exculpatory DNA test results, rather than mere 
access to DNA evidence, would invalidate the conviction.
163
 The 
other six circuits correctly recognized that Heck considers only the 
immediate consequences that success under § 1983 would have on 
 
 156. Brief for Respondent, supra note 60, at *26–29.  
 157. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2011). The Supreme Court hinted at this 
possibility during oral arguments. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 49:23-25, 
where Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg remarked, ―It‘s given here that this evidence would not 
necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the conviction. . . .‖ 
 158. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.  
 159. See supra notes 100–02 (explaining how the motivationally based ―setting the stage‖ 
rationale was used to reject DNA evidence requests under § 1983).  
 160. Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1296 (―the question below was ‗not whether [Skinner] will 
ultimately prevail‘ on his procedural due process claim [and receive access to the evidence] but 
whether his complaint was sufficient to cross the federal court‘s threshold.‖) (internal citations 
omitted).  
 161. Id. at 1293 (―Success in the suit gains for the prisoner only access to the DNA 
evidence, which may prove exculpatory, inculpatory, or inconclusive. In no event will a 
judgment that simply orders DNA test ‗necessarily impl[y] the unlawfulness of the State‘s 
custody.‘‖).  
 162. See supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text.  
 163. See supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text.  
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the conviction and understood motivation to be irrelevant.
164
 Even 
though hindsight may show that success on the § 1983 claim was the 
precursor to a later DNA exoneration, this possibility is not enough to 
preclude the claim under Heck as it currently stands.
165
  
Heck bars § 1983 claims only if the specific relief requested would 
necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction.
166
 Notably, the 
Heck Court did not set the threshold at ―imply‖ but included 
―necessarily‖ as a significant qualifier: ―[W]e were careful in Heck to 
stress the importance of the term ‗necessarily.‘‖167 Because access to 
DNA evidence alone neither implies, let alone necessarily implies 
anything about the conviction, DNA access requests cannot be barred 
by Heck.
168
 The only fact that granting access to DNA evidence 
necessarily implies is that biological material found at the crime 
scene exists.
169
  
Texas‘s rationale for denying § 1983 DNA evidence requests was 
unconvincing because it was based on a faulty assumption.
170
 Texas 
worried that granting DNA evidence requests under § 1983 would 
provide prisoners with a federal vehicle to pursue collateral attacks 
on state court convictions.
171
 This argument assumed that Skinner‘s 
claim attacked the conviction, but at the time Skinner made his 
argument, that determination had not been made.
172
 The only way 
that § 1983 could undermine state court deference is if DNA 
evidence requests were determined to both attack the conviction and 
 
 164. See supra notes 105–12 and accompanying text.  
 165. During oral arguments, Justice Anthony Kennedy remarked, ―[I]f we were going to 
adhere to Dotson and still rule for you [Texas] . . . there has to be some slightly different 
qualification.‖ Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 42:10-12.  
 166. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.  
 167. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298–99 (2011) (quoting Nelson v. Campbell, 
541 U.S. 637, 647 (2004)). 
 168. The Supreme Court will likely agree on this point. See Transcript of Oral Argument, 
supra note 18, at 46:3-5, where Justice Elena Kagan states that DNA evidence is a ―tool that 
[Skinner] hopes will lead to a quicker release, although it has no certainty at all of doing so.‖  
 169. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(a)(1)(A)(i) (West 2010) (explaining that a 
court may only grant access to DNA evidence if it exists in testable condition).  
 170. See supra notes 153–56 and accompanying text.  
 171. See supra notes 153–56.  
 172. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (explaining that though the Supreme Court 
has been presented with the issue, it had not yet decided whether Heck bars DNA evidence 
requests under § 1983). Of course, it later ruled that Heck does not bar DNA evidence requests, 
thereby invalidating the argument. Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1296. 
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also allowed to proceed under § 1983.
173
 Heck, however, precludes 
that possibility because it bars all claims that would necessarily affect 
the conviction from § 1983.
174
 And in hindsight, the Skinner Court 
also precludes this possibility.
175
 
Nor does the breadth of § 1983 relief alter the scope of habeas 
relief.
176
 This argument assumed that the choice between § 1983 and 
habeas is mutually exclusive, but Heck shows that it is not.
177
 This 
assumption creates the converse of the initial argument: should Heck 
bar a claim under § 1983, then habeas would become unduly 
broadened to include claims that only indirectly challenge the 
conviction.
178
 Because this consequence conflicts with the purpose 
for the habeas distinction—to ensure that habeas relief remains 
limited to clear attacks on the conviction—it cannot be correct.179  
Skinner, however, still must succeed on the merits under § 1983 in 
Texas federal court before he will receive access to the DNA 
evidence. At oral arguments, Skinner argued that the Chapter 64 no-
fault provision is unconstitutional as construed because it does not 
provide an exception to the rule.
180
 Challenging the constitutionality 
of Chapter 64 is difficult because the law is facially constitutional 
and satisfies the National Innocence Project‘s recommendations for 
an effective post-conviction DNA access statute.
181
 As Osborne 
 
 173. See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text (explaining that habeas is the sole 
remedy for attacks on the conviction).  
 174. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.  
 175. Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1298-99.  
 176. See supra notes 64–73 and accompanying text (the two statutes provide different 
remedies for different wrongs and failure to qualify under one statute does not ensure that relief 
is available under the other).  
 177. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text (demonstrating that petitioner Heck 
was denied relief under both habeas and § 1983).  
 178. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (recognizing that under Texas‘s reading of 
Heck, exclusion under § 1983 would mean inclusion under habeas). Because this would mean 
that a claim not directly challenging the conviction [request for DNA evidence] would be 
recognized under habeas, it cannot be correct. See supra note 73 and accompanying text 
(habeas is reserved only for claims that attack the conviction).  
 179. See supra notes 64, 76 and accompanying text (explaining the purpose of habeas and 
the rationale for the habeas exception to § 1983).  
 180. See supra notes 138–43 and accompanying text.  
 181. The National Innocence Project has identified key elements that should be included in 
all DNA access laws in order to ensure that prisoners have ample access to test the DNA 
evidence that may prove their innocence. See Access to Post-Conviction DNA testing, supra 
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acknowledged, each state has the right to set its own requirements for 
post-conviction relief independent of substantive due process 
concerns.
182
 Failure to meet state-imposed requirements, as Texas 
alleged happened here, may properly extinguish the claim.
183
  
Whether Texas arbitrarily denied Skinner the chance to prove his 
innocence under Chapter 64 will be decided on remand.
184
 If the 
Texas district court agrees that the blanket no-fault provision is 
arbitrary as construed, then Skinner will receive access to the DNA 
evidence.
185
  
In any event, DNA testing should have been performed years 
ago.
186
 Texas erred in dismissing both Chapter 64 motions, and 
Skinner should have appealed both denials.
187
 The first motion was 
denied because Skinner could not establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he ―would not have been convicted if exculpatory 
results on the requested items had been obtained through DNA 
testing.‖188 If, however, multiple items of crime scene evidence 
excluded Skinner as the DNA contributor, or if the source profile 
matched an alternative suspect, then Skinner‘s guilt necessarily 
would be called into question.
189
 Texas was too quick to presume that 
DNA testing of an additional seven items of crime scene evidence 
would not cast doubt on Skinner‘s conviction.190 Ironically, the 
 
note 14. Chapter 64 incorporates the recommended elements. See supra note 144 and 
accompanying text.  
 182. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.  
 183. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 54:2-8 (―The statute [Chapter 64] 
gives the conditions under which a petitioner can seek DNA evidence, and it said you didn‘t 
meet those conditions.‖). 
 184. See Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1300.  
 185. See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.  
 186. Indeed, under current Texas law SB 122, enacted in June 2011, Skinner would have 
had the right to test the DNA evidence. See infra AFTERWORD.  
 187. See supra notes 113–19 and accompanying text.  
 188. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text. 
 189. See Dist. Att‘y‘s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2337 (2009) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (―DNA evidence has led to an extraordinary series of exonerations . . . [even] in 
cases where the convicted parties confessed their guilt and where the trial evidence against 
them appeared overwhelming.‖); see also id. at 2337 n.9 (citing Brandon L. Garrett, Judging 
Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 109 (2008)) (documenting that in 50 percent of DNA 
exoneration cases courts had commented on the defendant‘s likely guilt and in 10 percent had 
characterized the evidence of guilt as ―overwhelming‖). 
 190. ―But it is, of course, always the case that a convicted person who is later exonerated 
by DNA testing has first been found guilty, often on ‗ample‘ evidence. And it is frequently the 
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Court‘s holding here supports Skinner‘s § 1983 argument that access 
to the DNA evidence (let alone exculpatory test results) would not 
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.
191
  
Skinner‘s second Chapter 64 motion was improperly denied 
because he was never at fault for his trial counsel‘s refusal to request 
DNA testing.
192
 Rather than attack the no-fault provision as 
fundamentally unfair,
193
 Skinner should have appealed the initial 
classification.
194
 The same assertions made at oral arguments could 
have sufficed.
195
 To be fundamentally fair and adequate, the no-fault 
provision must distinguish between passive failures to request testing 
and affirmative denials of presented opportunities to test specific 
items of evidence.
196
 Only the latter should be sufficient to warrant 
the Chapter 64 no-fault bar.
197
 Because Skinner was never personally 
presented with the opportunity to refuse DNA testing on any item, he 
should not have been denied testing on the no-fault ground.
198
 Had 
Skinner successfully appealed either of these two denials, he would 
have avoided the risk of dismissal for failure to state a claim under 
§ 1983 or of losing on the merits on remand.
199
  
 
case that, before exonerating DNA results are obtained, prosecutors and courts characterize the 
evidence of guilt as ‗overwhelming[].‘‖ Petitioner‘s Reply to Respondent‘s Brief in Opposition 
to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 116, at *4.  
 191. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. Texas denied Skinner‘s request for testing 
under Chapter 64 because it felt that additional DNA testing would not affect his conviction. 
See supra notes 115–16. Now, Texas argues that the DNA evidence would affect his conviction 
and thus must be barred from § 1983. See supra notes 148–51.  
 192. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 54:20-55:15. 
 193. See supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text. 
 194. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.  
 195. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18.  
 196. Id. at 55:13-15 (―I have always felt it was intuitively, especially unfair to accuse 
[Skinner] of laying behind a log when there is no log to lie behind.‖). 
 197. Id.  
 198. Id. at 55:1-4 (―[S]o that to the extent the Court of Criminal Appeals portrayed Mr. 
Skinner as making a choice, that‘s . . . not accurate because he didn‘t make the choice.‖). Texas 
should remedy the provision to require trial attorneys to warn prisoners that foregoing testing at 
the trial stage will bar subsequent requests under the Chapter 64 no-fault provision. See 
generally Fix the System, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/Priority-
Issues.php (last visited Nov. 13, 2011) (explaining that denying DNA tests due to trial counsel‘s 
failure to request testing inhibits the delivery of justice). This would better ensure that prisoners 
do in fact make affirmative and informed decisions that the state can later argue definitely 
establishes the prisoner‘s fault. See id.  
 199. See supra notes 68–69, 181 and accompanying text.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
350 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 38:325 
 
 
III. PROPOSAL 
Fundamental fairness dictates that any and all properly preserved 
DNA evidence relevant to guilt be tested before a man is put to 
death.
200
 DNA‘s track record on death row alone is enough to support 
the enunciation of a federal constitutional right to test DNA evidence 
in these special circumstances.
201
 Each new DNA exoneration gives 
clarity to the harsh reality that individuals are wrongfully 
convicted.
202
 DNA evidence is the preeminent tool available to the 
criminal justice system,
203
 and the Court cannot continue to allow 
states to ignore its potential.
204
 The argument for state court deference 
in the criminal justice system is strong.
205
 But deference is no longer 
deserved if states continue to deny DNA testing at the risk of 
executing innocent men.
206
  
Osborne stated that the creation of a federal right to test DNA 
evidence would be premature because states were dealing with DNA 
adequately and effectively.
207
 But, as illustrated by Texas‘s denial in 
Skinner, federal interference is now necessary.
208
 Skinner repeatedly 
requested DNA testing.
209
 Testing was to be done at his own 
expense.
210
 Questions about his guilt remain.
211
 For Texas to deny 
Skinner this opportunity at no cost to itself, and instead set a date for 
 
 200. See Death, DNA and The Supreme Court, supra note 29, at A34.  
 201. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.  
 202. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.  
 203. See Dist. Att‘y‘s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2316 (2009). 
 204. See supra note 14 (explaining that state post-conviction DNA access statutes continue 
to deny DNA access requests even when guilt is uncertain and testing would provide the 
answer).  
 205. See supra note 66.  
 206. See Editorial, Still Cruel, Less Usual, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2010, at A22 (―The 
irreversible punishment of death requires a foolproof justice system, but growing numbers of 
DNA exonerations in recent years suggest that it is far from that.‖).  
 207. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.  
 208. See Still Cruel, Less Usual, supra note 29, at A22 (stating that though Osborne denied 
a federal constitutional right to post-conviction DNA testing, Skinner ―is a chance for course 
correction‖). Further evidence that Chapter 64 was arbitrary and unfair is the June 2011 
enactment of SB 122. See infra AFTERWORD.  
 209. See supra note 10.  
 210. Complaint, supra note 4, ¶ 2; see also supra note 35.  
 211. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
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his execution, personifies injustice.
212
 At worst, DNA tests would be 
inconclusive and Skinner‘s conviction would stand.213 At best, an 
innocent man is spared his life.
214
 At absolute, the most probative 
evidence available would be called upon to serve the system.
215
  
Enunciation of a federal constitutional right for death row inmates 
to access untested DNA evidence alleviates the concerns that Texas 
articulated in proposing to confine DNA evidence requests to 
habeas.
216
 First, the scope of the right is limited to the relatively few 
and manageable number of inmates convicted of a capital offense.
217
 
The right can require prisoners to first assert their innocence
218
 and 
can be limited to those cases where identity is at issue.
219
 Finally, the 
right may only be invoked in the smaller subset of capital cases 
where DNA evidence actually exists in a testable condition.
220
  
Second, the right conserves rather than exhausts resources.
221
 
Skinner alone illustrates the extensive resources necessary to litigate 
a post-conviction right to test DNA evidence.
222
 The cost of a DNA 
analysis is cheaper than this expense, both for the state and for the 
defendant.
223
 Had Skinner been able to invoke an automatic right to 
 
 212. See supra notes 30, 33 and accompanying text.  
 213. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.  
 214. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.  
 215. See supra notes 13, 37 and accompanying text.  
 216. See supra notes 153–56 and accompanying text. 
 217. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.  
 218. See Myrna S. Raeder, PostConviction Claims of Innocence, 24 CRIM. JUST. 14, 15 
(Fall 2009). 
 219. The most common source of wrongful convictions stems from witness 
misidentification. Fix the System, supra note 198. DNA evidence remedies this problem 
because it can prove with ―near certainty‖ that the suspect was the true perpetrator. Dist. Att‘y‘s 
Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2316 (2009).  
 220. Only 5 to 10 percent of all criminal cases involve DNA evidence. The Causes of 
Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2012).  
 221. The argument that allowing DNA requests under § 1983 would unduly lengthen the 
post-conviction process fails to recognize the parallel ability of such a right to shorten post-
conviction procedures. Brief for the National Crime Victim Law Institute as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondent, Skinner v. Switzer, 130 S. Ct. 3323 (2010) (No. 09-9000), at 12–14.  
 222. Skinner has been litigating his case for over sixteen years. See supra notes 8–10, 113–
25 and accompanying text.  
 223. See Still Cruel, Less Usual, supra note 206, at A22 (―Death rows and executions are 
expensive, and cash-strapped states seem more willing to investigate alternatives.‖); see also 
Financial Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.death 
penaltyinfo.org/costs-death-penalty#financialfacts (last visited Feb. 10, 2012) (stating that each 
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test DNA evidence, litigation would have concluded when his 
original execution date was set on October 20, 2009.
224
 Further, death 
row inmates could be required to fund the tests, thereby eliminating 
state costs in enforcing the right.
225
  
Third, this right facilitates rather than delays the delivery of 
justice.
226
 DNA tests ensure, to the best of the criminal system‘s 
ability, that the right man is brought to justice.
227
 If DNA shows that 
the incarcerated man is not the true culprit, then justice demands 
further investigation before any execution may occur.
228
 Capital 
defendants could be given one chance to invoke the right and could 
be required to waive all future appeals or requests for DNA testing if 
results are inconclusive or inculpatory.
229
  
Fourth, such a right does not unduly disrupt principles of federal-
state comity.
230
 States are free to preempt the invocation of the 
federal right by granting DNA evidence requests for death row 
inmates under state post-conviction statutes.
231
 Moreover, the 
Supreme Court can properly review state court decisions on 
constitutional issues.
232
  
 
death sentence costs Texas about $2.3 million). In comparison, Skinner‘s DNA tests would cost 
approximately $7,500. Telephone Interview with Jim Bentley, supra note 12. Bentley‘s lab 
volunteered to perform the STR analysis on the seven pieces of Skinner evidence for free. Id. 
Bentley stated that each piece of crime scene evidence costs approximately $850.00 to test and 
that each reference sample (DNA sample from the suspects and victims) costs roughly $425.00 
to obtain. Id.  
 224. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at *5.  
 225. Prisoners can secure funding from the 2004 Federal Justice For All Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3600 (West 2011), which allocates various justice-related funding to any state that grants 
DNA testing access to inmates claiming innocence. Access to DNA Testing, INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/DNA-Testing-Access.php (last visited Nov. 13, 
2011). Further, a DNA lab in Arizona has offered to test DNA evidence in certain cases 
(Skinner and Kevin Cooper) for free. See supra note 35.  
 226. See Dist. Att‘y‘s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2312 (2009).  
 227. See id.  
 228. See supra notes 33–34.  
 229. Duchess, Comment to Hank Skinner Set for Feb. 24th Execution, LIFE ON THE ROW 
(Dec. 12, 2009, 1:19AM), http://lifeontherow.proboards.com/index.cgi?board=sex&action= 
display&thread=3198.  
 230. See supra notes 66, 205–06 and accompanying text.  
 231. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
 232. See generally Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
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CONCLUSION 
DNA testing is simultaneously applauded for its unique ability to 
identify the true culprit and shunned for its consequential ability to 
upset the status quo.
233
 With each new DNA exoneration, the 
applause gets louder.
234
 The law must respond to the noise and 
recognize the need to test available DNA evidence.
235
 The Skinner 
Court necessarily recognized DNA evidence requests under § 1983, 
and the Texas federal court should hold that the Chapter 64 no-fault 
provision is procedurally inadequate.
236
 In fact, Texas‘s June 2011 
enactment of SB 122, which amends and rectifies the flaws in 
Chapter 64, is adequate evidence that Chapter 64, as it was in effect 
for Skinner, was unconstitutionally arbitrary.
237
  
But Skinner‘s fate should not be left to the court‘s 
determination.
238
 More is required in the special circumstances of 
capital cases because the answer to uncertainty cannot be ultimate 
finality. All reasonable avenues of inquiry must be exhausted when 
the alternative is a wrongful execution.
239
 On balance, this need 
enormously outweighs the state‘s interest in determining what Heck’s 
―necessarily implies‖ language permits.240 It would be ironic indeed 
to, in the interest of finality, deliberately deny the ability to ever 
conclusively know.
241
 The only way to extinguish the ghost is to let 
DNA bring it to life.
242
  
 
 233. See Dist. Att‘y‘s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2316 (2009).  
 234. In 2010 alone, DNA exonerated twenty-nine inmates. Innocence Network 
Exonerations—2010, INNOCENCE NETWORK, http://www.innocencenetwork.org/docs/innocence 
-network-exonerations-2014-2010 (last visited Nov. 13, 2011). 
 235. For a discussion of reforms needed in the criminal justice system, see Stopping 
Wrongful Convictions Before They Happen, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject 
.org/fix/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2011). 
 236. See supra notes 157, 165, 168 (comments made at oral arguments suggested correctly 
that the Court would recognize DNA evidence requests under § 1983).  
 237. See infra AFTERWORD.  
 238. See supra notes 187–98 (discussing why Skinner‘s DNA request should have been 
granted under Chapter 64); see also supra note 200 (arguing that DNA must be tested before a 
man is put to death).  
 239. See supra notes 33–34.  
 240. See supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text. 
 241. See supra note 34.  
 242. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.  
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AFTERWORD 
Skinner‘s § 1983 suit for access to the DNA evidence is still 
pending in federal court in the Northern District of Texas Amarillo 
Division.
243
 Despite this pending suit, Texas reset Skinner‘s 
execution date to November 9,
 
2011.
244
  
Meanwhile, Texas signed SB 122 into law on June 17, 2011. The 
Act amends the flaws in Chapter 64 and among other improvements, 
renders the Chapter 64 no-fault bar used against Skinner moot.
245
 SB 
122 went into effect in on September 1, 2011, and days later Skinner 
filed a SB 122 motion for DNA testing. On November 2, 2011, his 
motion was denied.
246
 The denial was appealed to the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals, which issued a stay of execution on November 7, 
2011, this time to decide whether to award Skinner DNA testing 
under SB 122.
247
 On November 21, 2011, his SB 122 motion was 
denied for the second time.
248
  
 
 243. David Protess, Texas to Condemned Man: Execution First, DNA Later, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-protess/texas-to-condemned-man-
ex_b_994272.html 
 244. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
 245. Press Release, Texas Senator Rodney Ellis, Legislation to Expand Access to Post-
Conviction DNA Sent to the Governor (May 20, 2011) (explaining that ―[r]ecent court 
decisions and an exoneration‖ exposed flaws in the state‘s DNA law and that ―SB 122 will help 
fix those gaps.‖), available at http://www.ellis.senate.state.tx.us/pr11/p052011a.htm. The 
legislation requires post-conviction DNA testing would be granted if: [1] the biological 
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As of publication, no new execution date has been set and the fate 
of Hank Skinner is still unknown.
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